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7This paper explores the price-setting behavior of Austrian ﬁrms
based on survey evidence. Our main result is that customer relation-
ships are a major source of price stickiness in the Austrian economy.
We also ﬁnd that the majority of ﬁrms in our sample follows a time-
dependent pricing strategy. However, a substantial fraction of ﬁrms
deviates from time-dependent pricing in the case of large shocks and
switches to a state-dependent pricing strategy. In addition, we present
evidence suggesting that the price response to various shocks is subject
to asymmetries.
Keywords: Price-setting behavior, Price rigidity
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AbstractNon-technical summary
Nominal rigidities play a key role in most macroeconomic models used for
the analysis of monetary policy. The existence of sticky prices gives the cen-
tral bank leverage over the real interest rate, which allows monetary policy
to inﬂuence real economic activity. Although the importance of rigidities for
the monetary transmission mechanism appears to be well accepted, a better
understanding of the nature of the frictions seems to be crucial since the
optimal macroeconomic policy depends on the sources and characteristics
of these rigidities. Moreover, the analysis of nominal frictions is particularly
relevant in the case of a monetary union since diﬀerent degrees of price stick-
iness in the member countries might give rise to cross-country diﬀerences in
the transmission mechanism.
The economic literature distinguishes between two diﬀerent kinds of
price setting policies. Firms following a time-dependent pricing rule can
change their prices only at speciﬁc time intervals, while ﬁrms applying state-
dependent pricing can change their prices whenever they like, especially if
the economic environment changes. These two pricing policies have diﬀerent
consequences for price adjustments following an economic disturbance. Un-
der a state-dependent rule, the ﬁrm changes its prices instantaneously after
a shock (given that the shock is large enough), while with a time-dependent
pricing policy it has to wait for the next opportunity. We ﬁnd evidence that
the ﬁrms in our sample follow time-dependent as well as state-dependent
pricing strategies. Under normal circumstances around 70 percent of the
ﬁrms apply time-dependent pricing. However, in the face of major shocks
almost half of the ﬁrms deviate from this strategy and set their prices accord-
ing to the state of the economy. Comparing this share with evidence from
other countries suggests that the share of ﬁrms following state-dependent
pricing rules in response to large shocks (56 percent) is relatively small in
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stages. First, ﬁrms review their prices to check whether they are at the
optimal level or they need to be changed. Second, if ﬁrms ﬁnd out that
the price deviates from its optimal level, they need to decide whether to
change the price or not. We ﬁnd evidence that there are obstacles to price
adjustments at both stages. However, the contest of the theories about
price stickiness reveals that the main obstacles to price adjustment seem to
lie at the second stage of price setting. Thus, informational costs, which
are important at the reviewing (ﬁrst) stage of price setting, do not seem
to be among the most important obstacles to price changes. The fear that
a price adjustment could jeopardize customer relationships (expressed in
the theories on implicit and explicit contracts) seems to be a much more
important explanation for sticky prices.
Finally, we investigate the reaction of prices to (cost and demand) shocks.
The average time lag between a shock and the price adjustment is four to six
months. Furthermore, we observe that ﬁrms react asymmetrically to cost
and demand shocks. Prices are more sticky downwards than upwards in the
face of cost shocks as more ﬁrms react more quickly to cost-push shocks than
to decreasing cost shocks. In the case of large demand shocks, however, the
opposite is true. Prices are more sticky upwards than downwards, because
more ﬁrms react to receding demand than to increasing demand. If we
interpret a monetary shock as a demand shock, it follows that monetary
policy should have an asymmetric impact on the Austrian economy.
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Nominal rigidities play a key role in most macroeconomic models used for the
analysis of monetary policy. In what appears to be the workhorse model for
monetary policy evaluation, the fact that prices are sticky gives the central
bank leverage over the real interest rate, which allows monetary policy to
inﬂuence economic activity via aggregate demand.1
Although the importance of rigidities for the monetary transmission
mechanism appears to be well accepted, a better understanding of the na-
ture of the frictions that lead to monetary non-neutrality in the short run
seems to be crucial for the conduct of monetary policy since the optimal
macroeconomic policy depends on the sources and characteristics of these
rigidities. Moreover, the analysis of nominal frictions is particularly relevant
in the case of a monetary union since diﬀerent degrees of price stickiness in
the member countries might give rise to cross-country diﬀerences in the
transmission mechanism.
In this paper we investigate price stickiness in Austria. We follow the
seminal work of Blinder et al. (1998) and analyze survey evidence focusing
on the price-setting behavior of Austrian ﬁrms.2 Conducting a survey has
the advantage that it allows to confront actual decision makers with the
chain of reasoning that a speciﬁc theory of price stickiness describes. This
appears to be an important advantage over assessing theories according to
whether or not their testable implications are consistent with the data since
most theories share virtually the same prediction, namely that prices are
sticky.3
The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we present some styl-
ized facts on price setting in Austria. In particular, we study the question
1See for instance Clarida et al. (1999).
2For similar studies focusing on other countries see Apel et al. (2001), Aucremanne
and Druant (2004), Fabiani et al. (2004b), Hall et al. (1997), Hoeberichts and Stokman
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Second, we try to discriminate between diﬀerent explanations of price stick-
iness advocated in the literature. This appears to be an interesting and
important issue since the sources of price stickiness matter for the conduct
of monetary policy. And ﬁnally, we analyze how ﬁrms react to shocks that
hit the economy.
We ﬁnd that time-dependent and state-dependent pricing strategies are
prevalent among the ﬁrms in our sample. Approximately 70 percent of the
ﬁrms follow a time-dependent pricing strategy under normal circumstances.
However, around 50 percent of these ﬁrms deviate from time-dependent pric-
ing in the case of large shocks. Moreover, ﬁrms tend to react asymmetrically
to shocks. While more ﬁrms adjust their prices in reaction to increasing costs
than to decreasing costs, the opposite is true in the case of large demand
shocks. More ﬁrms react to receding demand than to increasing demand.
Overall, the average time lag between a shock to either demand or costs
and the price adjustment lies in the range between four and six months.
Finally, we ﬁnd that the main explanation for sticky prices is the customer
relationship. Firms shy away from price adjustments (especially in response
to demand shocks) because they do not want to jeopardize their customer
relationships. Firms that sell mostly to regular costumers are less likely to
react to shocks by adjusting prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 brieﬂy
discusses the conduct of our survey. Section 3 focuses on price reviews and
price changes while Section 4 investigates the explanatory content of various
theories of price stickiness for our data set. Section 5 deals with time lags
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2.1 Implementation of the survey
When compiling the questionnaire, we drew upon the experience of Blinder
et al. (1998) for the U.S., Hall et al. (1997) for the U.K., Apel et al. (2001) for
Sweden, Wied-Nebbeling (1985) for Germany and Fabiani et al. (2004b) for
Italy. However, the empirical designs of these studies show some diﬀerences.
Blinder et al. (1998) used a sample of 200 private ﬁrms, which were surveyed
in face-to-face interviews. The other studies used (much) larger samples
with ﬁll-in type of questionnaires. The Austrian survey was carried out
as a ﬁll-in questionnaire as well, and was sent as a supplement with the
monthly WIFO Business Cycle Survey (BCS) in January 2004.4 In total,
we contacted a sample of 2427 ﬁrms from the manufacturing and industry-
related service (hereinafter referred to as services) sectors by mail, and 873
ﬁrms participated in the survey.5 Thus, we obtained an overall response
rate of 36 percent, which can be regarded as high given the complexity of
the issue and the length of the questionnaire.6
As shown in Figure 2 and Table A1 in the Annex, the response rates vary
considerably across sectors and according to ﬁrm size. More manufacturing
ﬁrms participated in the survey than service sector ﬁrms, and we recorded
above-average participation of small ﬁrms (with less than 100 employees)
whereas very large ﬁrms tended not to answer the questionnaire.
When asking about price setting, one has to deal with the issue that
many ﬁrms sell several types of goods in diﬀerent (domestic or foreign) mar-
kets. In order to operationalize this issue, we asked the respondents to refer
4See Appendix B for an English version of the questionnaire sent to manufacturing
ﬁrms. We sent a slightly diﬀerent version of the questionnaire to service sector ﬁrms.
This, as well as the original German versions of the questionnaires, can be obtained from
the authors upon request.
5We mailed the questionnaires to the decision makers of the ﬁrms (ﬁrm owners, CEOs
or assistants of CEOs). In the ﬁrst week of February 2004 a reminder letter was sent to
approximately 1800 ﬁrms which had not responded by the end of January.
6The questionnaire consists of 13 sets of questions adding up to 79 detailed questions.
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ket. This should avoid the problem that the respondents lose the focus and
switch between diﬀerent products when answering the questionnaire. We
also decided to exclude some sectors a priori because the concept of a main
product was less suitable for them (e.g. construction, retailing) as pointed
out by Hall et al. (1997). In addition, some sectors had to be disregarded be-
cause they are not included in the WIFO BCS sample. Overall, the included
sectors represent 42 percent of Austria’s value added in 2001.7
The WIFO BCS sample was established as a stratiﬁed sample in the
1970s and has been re-stratiﬁed several times since then. As can be seen from
Figure 2 in the Appendix the sample and the response show a bias: industrial
(intermediate goods-producing) and large (well-established and successful)
ﬁrms are over-represented in terms of number of ﬁrms and employees, which
is a common characteristic in longitudinal data sets of this kind.8 To correct
for these eﬀects, we post-stratify the answers according to the sector of
activity and the size class each ﬁrm belongs to (see Table A1 in the Annex
for details on the post-stratiﬁcation weights).
The questionnaire collects diﬀerent types of information about the par-
ticipating ﬁrms. In the ﬁrst part, Questions A1 to A8 inquire several charac-
teristics of the responding ﬁrms (e.g. main product, turnover shares, market
and client structures). According to this information, 80 percent of the ﬁrms
in our sample operate mainly in the domestic market9. Approximately three
quarters of the respondents deal primarily with other ﬁrms. Just 7 percent
deal directly with consumers and 5 percent report to have the government as
their main customer. Moreover, 87 percent of the respondents achieve more
7The following sectors are covered in our survey: manufacturing (15, 17 to 36) and
some industry-related services (60, 63, 70 to 74, 90). Codes in parentheses correspond to
the NACE 2-digit classiﬁcation.
8In the sample no newly founded ﬁrms are represented. In addition, ﬁrms which did
not respond four times in a row (e.g. because of bankruptcy) are excluded form the BCS.
9The Austrian market is regarded as their main market, if they earn more than 60
percent of their turnover there.
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indicate that our results focus on producer prices and that an environment
of imperfect competition might be a good proxy for the market situation
our ﬁrms operate in as they mainly deal with regular customers.
The price-setting process is the focus of Questions B1 to B7. To assess
the importance of diﬀerent theories about sticky prices, eleven theoretical
concepts were translated into questions in everyday language (Questions
B8 and B9). In Question B11 we ask about the reasons for price changes
(e.g. labor costs, intermediate-good price changes). Finally, the issues of
asymmetries of price adjustments (increases vs. decreases), price reactions
to diﬀerent kinds of shocks (demand vs. cost shocks) and the inﬂuence of
the size of a shock (small vs. large shocks) are addressed in Question B10.
According to the answers to Question B1, about 82 percent of the re-
spondents are able to set prices by themselves. We restrict the analysis
discussed in the following sections to these 715 ﬁrms.11
2.2 Economic conditions
When ﬁlling in the questionnaire, the respondents were asked to answer
either in a general way (i.e. how they usually react) or by indicating how
they acted in the last years. Thus, their responses are a snapshot depending,
among other things, on the economic situation in Austria at the time the
survey was conducted.
In the following we brieﬂy sketch the macroeconomic conditions at the
time of the survey (for details see Table A6 in the Annex). Caused by an
international business cycle downturn, economic growth in Austria lost its
momentum after 2000. Following growth rates (in real terms) well above
3 percent, the economy slowed down markedly to rates below 1 percent.
10A selection of these results is reported in Appendix A, Tables A2 to A5.
11The alternative answers were that e.g. the parent company, the main client or a
regulatory authority determines prices.
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to 0.8 percent in 2003.
3 Price-setting behavior of Austrian ﬁrms
3.1 Time-dependent versus state-dependent pricing rules
In this section we investigate the price-setting strategy of ﬁrms. The idea
that economic agents cannot or do not want to change prices and wages
instantaneously after shocks was introduced in the economic literature in
diﬀerent ways. Fischer (1977) as well as Taylor (1979, 1980) use the idea of
nominal long-term labor contracts in order to inject an element of stickiness
into the behavior of nominal wages. Blanchard (1983, 1986) for example
applies the idea of monopolistic competition in the goods and labor mar-
kets, which creates an adjustment process of wages and prices that takes
some time. This enables them to model nominal shocks having an eﬀect on
the short run behavior of output. Consequently, they argue that monetary
policy can aﬀect real output in the short run, rational expectations notwith-
standing. Modeling the timing of wage and price changes is crucial to the
real eﬀects of nominal disturbances and is thus one of the cornerstones in
New Keynesian macroeconomics.
The time interval of the nominal contracts modeled e.g. by Fischer
(1977) and Taylor (1979, 1980) is ﬁxed exogenously and the length is known
in advance. Calvo (1983) introduces a stochastic element in the price-setting
behavior by assuming that each price setter is allowed to change the price
following a random signal. These models have in common that the agents
cannot change their prices whenever they like, but have to hold prices con-
stant for a (known or unknown) period of time. They are using a time-
dependent pricing rule, where the time between successive price revisions
cannot be chosen by the ﬁrm.
The second strand of literature follows a diﬀerent line of argument on
12
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price adjustment policy in the tradition of Barro (1972) developed further
e.g. by Sheshinski and Weiss (1977). Whenever a price setter adjusts his or
her price, he or she sets it such that the diﬀerence between the actual and
the optimal price equals some target level S. The economic agent then keeps
the nominal price at this level until the diﬀerence between the actual and the
target level reaches the trigger level s, which induces an adjustment in the
nominal price level. In these models the intervals between price adjustments
depend on the nature, the direction as well as the frequency of shocks.
These two pricing policies have diﬀerent consequences for price adjust-
ments following an economic disturbance. Thus, they have diﬀerent impli-
cations for the transmission of nominal shocks to the real economy. Under
a state-dependent rule, the ﬁrm changes its prices instantaneously after a
shock (given that the shock is large enough), while with a time-dependent
pricing policy it has to wait for the next opportunity. If one economy faces
a higher share of ﬁrms operating time-dependent pricing rules than another
economy, then - all other things being equal - this could translate into a
higher real eﬀect of (large) nominal shocks in the short run. Consequently,
the eﬀect of monetary policy on the real economy is sensitive to the share
of ﬁrms using time-dependent and state-dependent pricing policies.12
These concepts of pricing rules are diﬃcult to explain in a questionnaire.
Especially because it might be the case that ﬁrms are just able to adjust
their prices at exogenous dates (as in the time-dependent rule described
above) but because in the last years no shocks occurred that would have
warranted a price change, the ﬁrms did not change their prices at these
predeﬁned time intervals. Thus, they might not agree to the statement that
they change their prices regularly. That is why we did not ask whether
12In the case of shocks which are too small to guarantee that the diﬀerence between
the actual price and the optimal price becomes large enough to trigger a price change
for all ﬁrms following a state-dependent pricing strategy, it is not clear-cut whether a
time-dependent or a state-dependent rule entails more ﬂexible prices.
13
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time- and state-dependent 210.24 30.16%
other reasons 28.45 4.08%
no review without change 14.33 2.06%
Total 697.00 100.00%
they follow state-dependent and time-dependent pricing rules. Instead, we
asked which strategy the ﬁrms follow when reviewing their prices (Question
B6a). Following Apel et al. (2001), we allowed the respondents to choose
from the following answers: (1) the ﬁrm reviews the price regularly, (2) the
ﬁrm reviews the price on speciﬁc occasions, (3) in general the ﬁrm reviews
its price regularly and also on speciﬁc occasions, (4) for other reasons and
lastly (5) the ﬁrm never checks prices without changing them. We interpret
the answer category (1) as a time-dependent rule, (2) as a state-dependent
rule and (3) as normally time-dependent with a switch to a state-dependent
regime if suﬃciently signiﬁcant changes occur.
According to our results, which are presented in Table 1, price reviews
seem to be a common practice in the ﬁrms’ pricing strategies. Nearly 98 per-
cent of the respondents apply one of the above-mentioned reviewing strate-
gies without necessarily changing their prices. Furthermore, our results
suggest that both state-dependent and time-dependent strategies are pur-
sued by Austrian ﬁrms.13 Under normal conditions (in the absence of major
shocks) approximately 68 percent of the ﬁrms carry out price reviews at
constant time intervals, while approximately 26 percent conduct price re-
views on speciﬁc occasions. This is in line with the results in Blinder et al.
(1998) for the U.S., Apel et al. (2001) for Sweden and Aucremanne and
13There are no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the share of ﬁrms following the
pricing strategies as reported in Table 1 across e.g. size classes, sectors, export share.
14
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companies follow time-dependent and one third state-dependent reviewing
strategies under normal circumstances.14
However, the picture changes considerably when we allow for shifts in
the reviewing policies. Approximately 30 percent of the Austrian ﬁrms will
alter their behavior in response to speciﬁc events and will change to state-
dependent reviewing. When signiﬁcant changes occur, 38 percent of the
ﬁrms stick to their practice of checking their prices regularly, while nearly
56 percent apply state-dependent price reviews. Comparing this share with
the results from other euro area countries, we ﬁnd country-speciﬁc diﬀer-
ences. While the share of ﬁrms applying state-dependent reviewing in the
face of exceptional circumstances is 54 percent in Italy (see Fabiani et al.
(2004b)) and 56 percent in Austria, it amounts to 61 percent in France (see
Loupias and Ricart (2004)), 64 percent in the Netherlands (see Hoeberichts
and Stokman (2004)) and Portugal (see Martins (2004)) and 74 percent in
Belgium (see Aucremanne and Druant (2004)). In the light of our above
considerations, these results would suggest that in response to major shocks
prices should respond more ﬂexibly in Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal
and France than in Austria and Italy.
In Question B11 we asked the ﬁrms what factors actually drove price
adjustments in recent years. One of the twelve answer categories the ﬁrms
could choose from was “We raise prices at regular intervals”. Combining the
answers from this question with the information about whether the ﬁrms
follow a time-dependent or a state-dependent reviewing policy results in the
following picture: While 54 percent of the ﬁrms applying a time-dependent
rule agree to the statement “We raise prices at regular intervals”15, this is
14The results in the literature mentioned above vary between 59 percent and 66 percent
for ﬁrms following a time-dependent rule and between 30 percent and 34 percent for ﬁrms
following a state-dependent reviewing strategy.
15The respondents could choose from four answers: (1) describes us very well, (2) ap-
plicable, (3) inapplicable and (4) completely inapplicable. We assume that ﬁrms ticking
15
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answer (1) or (2) agree to the statement, while the other ﬁrms are assumed to disagree.just true for 23 percent of the ﬁrms conducting state-dependent reviews.
This statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence (at the 1 percent level) suggests that
there is a connection between time-dependent reviews and time-dependent
price changes, as we assumed above.
To conclude, we ﬁnd evidence that the ﬁrms’ reviewing strategies can
indeed be used as proxies for time-dependent and state-dependent pricing
rules. The results indicate that both types of price-setting strategies are
prevalent among Austrian ﬁrms. Furthermore, we infer from the literature
that the eﬀect of monetary policy on the real economy is sensitive to the
relative share of ﬁrms following time-dependent and state-dependent ap-
proaches. In Austria a comparatively smaller share of ﬁrms (56 percent)
applies state-dependent pricing rules in response to major shocks, which
suggests that the eﬀect of signiﬁcant monetary policy shocks on the real
economy should be larger in Austria than in countries having a higher share
of state-dependent price setters - all other things being equal.
3.2 How often do ﬁrms review their prices?
Those ﬁrms which indicated that they conduct periodic price reviews, ap-
plying a time-dependent pricing strategy, were asked at which intervals they
review their prices (Question B6b). As shown in Table 2, 25.5 percent of
the ﬁrms carry out their price reviews at a yearly frequency, 17.5 percent
half-yearly and 28.4 percent quarterly. Thus, the median ﬁrm reviews the
price of its main product quarterly, which is also the mode meaning that a
quarterly review is the most typical practice.
Given the observed diﬀerences in the reviewing behavior, we look for a
pattern explaining the diverse frequencies of price reviews. However, a Chi-
square test analyzing the equality of distribution over the frequency classes
with respect to some ﬁrms’ characteristics (e.g. market share, export share,
16
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Frequency Percent








share of explicit contracts) does not suggest any relationship at conventional
signiﬁcance levels. There is, however, one exception: the industrial grouping
the ﬁrm belongs to.16 Comparing the share of ﬁrms in diﬀerent industries
that review their prices more frequently than monthly (see Table A8), we
ﬁnd that this share is 44 percent and 49 percent in the intermediate goods
and capital goods sector, respectively, and below 25 percent in all the other
sectors (consumer durables, consumer non-durables and services). A t-test
analyzing the equality of proportions indicates a statistically signiﬁcant dif-
ference in the reviewing behavior in these industries (at the 5 percent level),
with ﬁrms in the intermediate goods and the capital goods sector reviewing
their prices more frequently.
The majority of ﬁrms does not check prices continuously but at discrete
time intervals. This could have several reasons. For one thing, this could be
related to the (potentially sporadic) arrival of information. Thus, it might
be possible that it does not make sense for ﬁrms to review their prices more
often, as no additional information would be available.17 For another, there
16In distinguishing between the industrial groupings, we follow the European Commis-
sion that splits the manufacturing sector into four groups: ﬁrms producing consumer
non-durables, consumer durables, intermediate goods and capital goods. Furthermore,
our sample comprises manufacturing-related services, which we add as a ﬁfth category to
our deﬁnition of industrial groupings.
17Kashyap (1995) rejects this hypothesis. He observes diﬀering reviewing behavior also
with regard to products having similar cost and demand characteristics. However, if
products are alike, then the arrival of the necessary information should be correlated as
17
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more than 50 2.73 0.9%
Total 312.00 100.0%
are costs associated with price reviews. If there are informational costs, then
it might be optimal for ﬁrms to forego the most topical information instead
of incurring these costs.
3.3 How often do ﬁrms change their prices?
The respondents were asked (Question B7) “How often do you change the
price of your main product on average in a given year?” Table 3 reports that
22.1 percent of the ﬁrms answered that they do not change their prices at
all, 54.2 percent change their prices once a year and 13.9 percent do it 2
to 3 times a year.18 Thus, 90 percent of the ﬁrms adjust their prices less
frequently than quarterly. The median ﬁrm changes its price yearly and
also the mode of this distribution lies at the yearly frequency. Just around
10 percent of the ﬁrms change their prices more often than 3 times a year.
These results are in line with Apel et al. (2001), Blinder et al. (1998) and
Hall et al. (1997) as well as with the results of eight euro area countries
described in Fabiani et al. (2004a), all of whom also ﬁnd that the modal
number of price changes per year lies at the yearly frequency.
As in the case of price reviews, we are interested in ﬁnding a pattern
explaining the diﬀerence in the behavior of adjusting prices. Again the
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changes
Review Price change
weekly or more frequently 5.5% 0.9%
monthly or more frequently 27.7% 2.1%
quarterly or more frequently 56.1% 9.8%
half-yearly or more frequently 73.6% 23.7%
yearly or more frequently 99.1% 77.9%
sector the ﬁrms operate in explains some of the diﬀerence in the frequency
of price changes. A Chi-square test analyzing the equality of distribution
over the frequency classes rejects the null hypothesis at the 5 percent level.
This result points into the same direction as the result on price reviews.
Firms in the intermediate and capital goods-producing sectors change their
prices more frequently (see Table A7).
3.4 The relation between price reviews and changes
Price changes occur considerably less frequently than price reviews. As
shown in Table 4 nearly 30 percent of the ﬁrms review their prices monthly
or more frequently, while just around 2 percent of the ﬁrms change their
prices at that frequency. The median ﬁrm reviews its price quarterly and
adjusts its price once a year. Furthermore, we ﬁnd a strong association
between the frequency of price reviews and changes. A ﬁrm that reviews
its price more often is also more likely to change its price at smaller time
intervals. A test for association is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 percent level.
The results suggest that price setting takes place at two stages. First,
the ﬁrms review their prices to check whether they are at the optimal level
or they need to be changed. They do that at discrete time intervals and
not continuously. Thus, some kind of stickiness can already be observed
at the ﬁrst stage of price setting. Second, once the price review has taken
place, ﬁrms might change their prices. However, they do so considerably less
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because there are no reasons to change them. But perhaps prices remain
unchanged because, even once ﬁrms have decided to incur the informational
costs of the review, they think that there are additional costs of changing
the price, which prevents the price adjustment. We will discuss the possible
sources of these costs in Section 4.
4 Why do ﬁrms prefer not to change prices?
4.1 Theories explaining price stickiness
In the economic literature we ﬁnd manifold explanations for sticky prices.
These range from physical menu costs to pricing points and implicit con-
tracts, to name but a few. As Blinder (1991) points out, however, it is
diﬃcult to evaluate which of these theories come close to the real world’s
obstacles to changing prices (one problem being observational equivalence).
Thus, Blinder started to apply the interview method as a new way of ﬁnding
out about the empirical relevance of diﬀerent theories. He explained selected
theories to managers in face-to-face interviews and assumed that they would
recognize the line of reasoning when it came close to their way of thinking.
We apply Blinder’s methodology to Austrian ﬁrms.
We confronted managers with eleven theories, which we chose taking into
account their relevance in the economic literature and their rankings in the
surveys already conducted (Apel et al. (2001), Blinder et al. (1998), Fabiani
et al. (2004b) and Hall et al. (1997)). In the following we will give a short
description of all eleven theories.19
1. Coordination failure It might not be attractive for a ﬁrm to change
its price since a change would not only aﬀect customers but also competing
ﬁrms. After a shock a ﬁrm might want to change its price, but only if the
other ﬁrms change their prices, too. If the ﬁrm is the only one to increase
19Here, we stick to the sequence with which they appear in the questionnaire.
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handed price reduction might spark a price war, which could in the end be
detrimental to the ﬁrm’s proﬁts.20 Thus, it might be preferable to a ﬁrm to
stick to its price as long as none of its competitors moves ﬁrst. Blinder et al.
(1998) call this “following the crowd”. Without a coordinating mechanism
which allows the ﬁrms to move together the prices might remain ﬁxed.
2. Explicit contracts Some of the theories explaining price stickiness
were ﬁrst applied to the labor market, which is for example true for explicit
contracts ﬁxing wages (e.g. see Fischer (1977)). However, this idea can as
well be applied to the product market. Firms have contractual arrange-
ments with their customers, in which they guarantee to oﬀer the product at
a speciﬁc price. An explanation why ﬁrms might engage in such agreements
is that they want to build up long-run customer relationships. This should
discourage customers from shopping elsewhere, stabilizing the ﬁrm’s future
sales. Customers are attracted by a constant price because it helps to min-
imize transaction costs (e.g. shopping time). Thus, customers focus on the
long-run average price rather than on the spot price. As will be described
in Section 4.2, explicit contracts are indeed widely used by Austrian ﬁrms.
3. Pricing points Some ﬁrms set their prices at psychologically attrac-
tive thresholds. Especially in the retailing sector we observe prices of, for
example, EUR 99.50 instead of EUR 100.00. This suggests that there are
non-continuities in the demand curve. Firms choose such pricing points be-
cause increasing the price above these thresholds would decrease demand
disproportionately. Customer behavior of this kind can cause price sticki-
ness. In the face of small shocks calling for small price changes ﬁrms might
not want to react (at least not immediately); instead they rather postpone
price adjustments until new events justify a large price change to the next
pricing point.
20This outcome depends crucially on the assumptions of the non-cooperative game. One
example of such a set-up is described in Stiglitz (1984).
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idea that ﬁrms regard the shock they are faced with as temporary. Thus,
they assume that the optimal new price will be short-lived as well, and they
will have to readjust the price in the opposite direction within a short time
period. This theory shares characteristics with the idea of explicit contracts
as both rely on the assumption that frequent price changes are detrimental
to customer relationships.
5. Menu costs The act of changing prices might be costly. Sheshinski
and Weiss (1977) motivate this idea with companies selling through cata-
logs because printing and distributing new catalogs generates non-negligible
costs. Thus, a company facing these costs will change its prices less fre-
quently than an otherwise identical ﬁrm without such costs. Akerlof and
Yellen (1985) and Mankiw (1985) show that even “small” costs of changing
prices can lead to nominal rigidities having “large” macroeconomic eﬀects.
In the following we will use the term menu cost in the narrow sense of fo-
cusing on the physical cost of changing prices, and not in a broad sense as
suggested by Ball and Mankiw (1994).
6. Cost-based pricing It is assumed that costs are an important determi-
nant in a ﬁrm’s pricing decision and that if costs do not change, prices will
not change either. Basically, this means that prices do not change because
other prices (costs of inputs) do not change. However, the argument goes
further. As products pass through diﬀerent stages of production, a (demand
or cost) shock somewhere in the production chain will take some time until
it is propagated further up the chain and ﬁnally to the consumers. Thus,
even small lags in the adjustment process of a single ﬁrm can add up to long
lags, when we take into account the whole chain of production.
7. Non-price competition Another possibility why prices are sticky is
that ﬁrms prefer to react to shocks by changing features of the product
other than the price. For example, instead of increasing the price, they
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could extend delivery times and/or reduce the level of service.8. Quality signal This question dealing with the quality of the product
is related to the above question about non-price competition. However, it
reverses the line of argument. It assumes that ﬁrms do not decrease the
price of their product because customers might wrongly interpret the price
decrease as a reduction in quality. Thus, they prefer to hold their nominal
prices constant.
9. Kinked demand curve The demand curve the ﬁrm faces has a break
in the sense that the ﬁrm loses many customers when it increases the price.
However, it will not gain many customers if it reduces the price. This theory
- like the idea of coordination failure - is based on interactions between ﬁrms.
The ﬁrm assumes that if it raises the price, no other ﬁrm will follow and it
will lose market share. Moreover, it assumes that if it decreases the price, all
competitors will follow suit and it will not gain customers. Thus, it might
prefer to hold its price constant.
10. Implicit contracts This theory is based on a similar line of reasoning
as the explicit contract theory but it goes one step further. Both theories
assume that ﬁrms want to build up long-run customer relationships in order
to make their future sales more predictable. In contrast to explicit contracts,
however, implicit contracts try to win customer loyalty simply by changing
prices as little as possible. Okun (1981, p.151) puts it like that: “Continuity
and reliability are vital to all these arrangements. But because ﬁrms are
subject to cost increases that they cannot control, they cannot maintain
and realistically pledge constancy of price over an indeﬁnite horizon.” This
is why Okun (1981) distinguishes between price increases due to cost shocks
and those that are due to demand shocks. He argues that higher costs are
an accepted rationale for rising prices, while increases in demand are viewed
as unfair. Consequently, ﬁrms hold prices constant in the face of demand
shocks, as they do not want to jeopardize customer relationships. They only
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adjust prices in response to cost shocks.11. Information costs As already mentioned above, Ball and Mankiw
(1994) suggest a broader use of the term menu costs, in the sense that it
includes more than just the physical costs of changing prices. In particular
they argue that “the most important costs of price adjustment are the time
and attention required of managers to gather the relevant information and
to make and implement decisions” (Ball and Mankiw, 1994, p. 142). In
the following, we will call these costs information costs. The distinction
between physical menu costs and information costs enables us to investigate
their relative importance in pricing decisions.
4.2 How relevant are these theories in practice?
This section focuses on the insights we gain from confronting managers with
the potential causes for sticky prices we described above. In Questions B8a
and B9 we asked: “If there are reasons to increase the price of your main
product, which of the following factors might prevent an immediate price
adjustment?”21 The list following this question contained the eleven theories
mentioned above, explained as simple as possible in layman’s language. For
every theory the respondents could choose from four answer categories (4 if
they agree very much and 1 if they disagree very much with the statement).
Table 5 ranks the theories according to their mean scores (in column 1) and
gives their standard errors (SE in column 2).
According to our results, implicit and explicit contracts are the explana-
tions for sticky prices which were cited most frequently by the respondents.
Both theories earned on average a grade of more than three and as their
mean scores are very close, we should regard both theories as the winners of
this contest. Column 3 and 4 give the results of testing the null hypothesis
that the theory’s mean score is equal to the score of the theory ranked just
21In Section 4.3 we deal with the question about price decreases.
24
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 464
March 2005below it. This indicates that the mean scores of the two winners are too
close to be - in a statistical sense - regarded as diﬀerent from each other.
Taking a closer look at the mean scores of all theories, we can divide the
participants of the contest into two groups. The ﬁrst ﬁve theories earned
average grades well above two, while the other six theories received a lower
level of support with mean scores well below two. Column 5 contains an
alternative way of ranking the theories, reporting a measure of how many
respondents agree to the respective theory. It gives the fraction of respon-
dents rating the theory as “applicable” or higher (grades 3 and 4). This
way of ranking distinguishes between the two groups of theories even more
clearly. While the ﬁrst ﬁve theories are regarded as applicable by more
than 50 percent of the respondents, the “tier two” group of theories received
support from less than 15 percent of the ﬁrms.
This way of ranking the theories gives almost the same sequence of the
theories’ relevance as the ranking according to the mean scores.22 Besides
explicit and implicit contracts, the top group in the contest comprises cost-
based pricing, kinked demand curve and coordination failure.
The results indicate that many ﬁrms refrain from changing their prices
frequently because they have written contracts or implicit agreements to
build up long-term customer relationships in order to safeguard tomorrow’s
sales. In line with this reasoning, we ﬁnd an association (at the 10 percent
level) between the ﬁrms agreeing to the implicit contract theory (rating it
with 3 and 4) and those having a high share of regular customers (which
was inquired in Question A8). 85 percent of all respondents have a high
proportion of regular customers accounting for more than 70 percent of
their sales.
22There is just one exception, namely menu costs would rank sixth under this criterion
and information cost would rank seventh.
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March 2005Just 4 ﬁrms out of 703 having answered this question say that they do
not have regular customers at all. It seems that regular customers are a
common phenomenon preventing frequent price changes.
In Question B2 we asked the ﬁrms whether they have explicit contracts
in place. We observe a very clear association between the ﬁrms with such
arrangements and those agreeing to the explicit contract theory as an expla-
nation for price stickiness (the test being signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level).
This indicates that the responses throughout the questionnaire seem indeed
to be consistent. Approximately 75 percent of all respondents have written
arrangements with their customers and the most typical practice is a con-
tract length of one year: 21 percent of the ﬁrms have price agreements valid
for less than one year, 68 percent for one year and 11 percent for more than
one year.
Columns 6 to 9 in Table 5 show the ranking of the eleven theories in other
surveys. (Column 6 refers to the results in Blinder et al. (1998) for the U.S.,
column 7 to Fabiani et al. (2004a) for an average of the results from nine
euro area countries, column 8 to Apel et al. (2001) for Sweden and column
9 to Hall et al. (1997) for the U.K.) There are, however, some diﬃculties
in comparing these rankings. The questionnaires cover diﬀerent theories,
and moreover the number of theories varies. Furthermore, the other sur-
veys contain theories which are not covered by the Austrian questionnaire.
However, we tried to deal with this problem by including the four best per-
forming theories of all other surveys in our questionnaire. Nonetheless, this
comparison points out that all the theories ranking ﬁrst and second in the
other surveys are within our top group of theories.23
The theories ranking in our “tier two” group include prominent candi-
dates like physical menu costs. Although they are a favorite explanation
for price stickiness in the theoretical literature, they seem to be less impor-
23There is one additional explanation among our best performers, namely the kinked
demand curve, which was just considered by Apel et al. (2001).
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covers ﬁrms operating in the manufacturing industry and in the industry-
related service sector. Thus, it includes mostly ﬁrms dealing with other
ﬁrms. Less than 10 percent of the respondents have ﬁnal consumers as their
main customers. This might be an explanation why theories like pricing
points and non-price competition are not regarded as good explanations for
price stickiness.24
To conclude, we want to go back to Section 3.4. There we discuss the
possibility that price setting might take place at two stages. At the ﬁrst
stage, the ﬁrms review their prices to ﬁnd out whether they are still opti-
mal, and at the second stage, they decide whether the circumstances allow
for a price change. In Section 3.4 we infer from our results that there seem
to be impediments to price adjustments at both stages. However, we were
not able to pinpoint which obstacles are regarded as more relevant by the
respondents. The explanation for price stickiness ranking sixth in Table 5
and labeled information costs might help answer this question. This the-
ory focuses on the costs associated with gathering information relevant for
pricing decisions. In short, this theory deals with the reviewing (ﬁrst) stage
of our two-stage approach. Obviously, these costs exist as more than 12
percent of the ﬁrms regard these costs as relevant (see Table 5, column 5).
However, as information costs just rank in the “tier two” group of theories,
the majority of the ﬁrms regard other impediments as more important.25
Thus, our results indicate that the main obstacles to adjusting prices to
their optimal level (implicit and explicit contracts) are associated with the
second stage of price setting and are related to the wariness of the ﬁrms to
24A test for association clearly points out (at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level) that ﬁrms
dealing mainly with consumers and retailers prefer the theory of pricing points much more
than the other ﬁrms.
25The theory of information costs was also considered by Apel et al. (2001), Aucremanne
and Druant (2004) and Martins (2004). There, the degree of recognition was very low as
well, and it ranked last in the Swedish and the Portuguese case and took the penultimate
rank in the Belgian results.
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customers.
4.3 More about price stickiness
In addition to the questions about theories explaining price stickiness in
the upward direction, we also investigate the reasons for downward price
stickiness. We posed two separate questions (B8a and B8b) according to
the direction of the price change for all but four theories. One exception is
the implicit contract theory, which is just related to price increases (B9b).
Furthermore, we explained the idea of the kinked demand curve in one
question (B9a) as it is related to price increases and decreases at the same
time. The question on information costs is related to price reviews in general
rather than changes, thus we packed it into one question as well (B9c).
Finally, the theory of quality signals is only relevant for price decreases
(B8b).26 The other seven theories were dealt with in two separate questions.
The ranking of the theories is surprisingly similar regardless of the di-
rection of the price change. Also in the case of downward rigidity, we ﬁnd
implicit contracts ahead of explicit contracts ranking ﬁrst and second, re-
spectively. The top group comprises exactly the same theories, all receiving
mean scores well above two. Within the “tier two” group the rankings
changed only slightly. The similarity of the ranking is also conﬁrmed by the
rank correlation coeﬃcient, which is 0.88. (For detailed results about the
theories’ ranking in the case of downward rigidity see Table A9 in Appendix
A.)
Apart from the direction of the price change, we want to investigate
whether the rankings of the eleven theories vary across industrial sectors
(see Table A10).27 In all sectors the theory about implicit contracts ranks
26This explains why Table 5 does not contain results about quality signals.
27As the results are very similar for upward and downward price rigidity, we report just
the ﬁndings with regard to impediments to price increases.
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Consumer Intermediate Capital Services
durables goods goods
Consumer non-durables 0.82 0.79 0.76 0.79
Consumer durables - 0.93 0.94 0.96
Intermediate goods - - 0.87 0.90
Capital goods - - - 0.94
ﬁrst or second and that about explicit contracts ranks ﬁrst, second or third.
Furthermore, the top group (top ﬁve theories) comprises the same theories
in all sectors. In short, the main message is the same for all industrial
groupings. Table 6, which displays the rank correlation coeﬃcients between
the ﬁve main industrial groupings, supports the above conclusion that the
rankings are indeed very similar. The correlation coeﬃcients vary between
0.76 and 0.96 and are generally at a high level.
5 Price adjustments
5.1 What is driving price changes?
This section deals with price adjustments, shedding light on the questions
about what drives prices, how prices respond to diﬀerent kinds of shocks
and the length of these time lags. Regarding the ﬁrst question about the
driving forces of price changes, the respondents were given a list of poten-
tial factors and were asked “Which of the factors were relevant for price
increases/decreases of your main product in recent years?” (Question B11a
for increases and B11b for decreases). As with other questions, the respon-
dents could indicate the importance ((4) very important, (3) important, (2)
not important and (1) completely unimportant) of a single factor. Figure 1
summarizes the results and gives the percentage of respondents indicating
that a factor was important (4 and 3) in their pricing decision.
83 percent and 70 percent of the respondents report that wage costs and
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Importance for price increases Importance for price decreases
costs of intermediate goods, respectively, were important driving forces to
raise prices. By contrast, the two most important reasons for price decreases
were changes in competitors’ prices (57 percent) and the improvement in
productivity (44 percent). As shown in Figure 1, for most of the factors the
proportion of respondents indicating that this factor is important for their
pricing decision is higher for price increases than for price decreases. How-
ever, there are three exceptions that are more relevant for price decreases
than for increases: A change in the competitor’s price is far more important
for a decision to decrease prices than to increase them, whereas a change
in the demand conditions and in forecasts are slightly more important for
downward than for upward revisions. Thus, the results suggest that price
increases and decreases are driven by diﬀerent factors. While mainly cost
factors drive prices up, mainly market factors are responsible for price re-
ductions. We share this ﬁnding with Fabiani et al. (2004a), who ﬁnd the
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their work.
5.2 Time lag of price reactions
In order to investigate the issue of price stickiness further, we analyze the
time lag of price adjustments. Thus, we included Question B10 “If the
demand for your main product rises slightly, how much time passes before
you change prices?” We asked eight questions along these lines in order to
distinguish between large and small, positive and negative as well as cost
and demand shocks.28 First, the ﬁrms were asked to indicate whether they
change prices in reaction to shocks or not. If they change prices in reaction
to a speciﬁc shock, they were then requested to give us the number of months
elapsing before the price change is executed.
The results are summarized in Table 7, which shows in the ﬁrst column
the fraction of ﬁrms holding their prices constant in response to a shock.
Furthermore, the second column gives the mean of the number of months
that elapse between the occurrence of the shock and the price reaction.
The average time lag of price reactions after shocks is four to six months.
The answers range from a price adjustment within the same month to a
time span of 24 months. The distribution is thus skewed to the right and
the median ﬁrm waits for three to four months until it changes its price.29
An adjustment process of one to two periods in macro models for Austria
using quarterly data seems to be justiﬁed on the ground of our results. A
comparison with the results from Blinder et al. (1998) - which are shown in
column three in Table 7 - indicates that the mean lag with which Austrian
ﬁrms react to shocks seems to be slightly longer than that of U.S. ﬁrms.
Blinder’s survey reveals that the average time lag is approximately three
28We did not, however, distinguish between temporary and permanent shocks.
29In reaction to a small positive demand shock the median ﬁrm’s response time is four
months. For all other shocks the time lag is three months.
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months.Table 7: Price reactions after shocks
(1) (2) (3)
Fraction of Mean lag
ﬁrms holding of price Blinder’s
Type of shock the price constant reaction mean lag
Small positive demand shock 82% 6.1
Large positive demand shock 63% 4.6 2.9
Small negative demand shock 82% 4.6
Large negative demand shock 52% 3.6 2.9
Small cost-push shock 38% 4.8
Large cost-push shock 8% 3.8 2.8
Small decreasing cost shock 71% 4.8
Large decreasing cost shock 38% 4.2 3.3
We draw the following conclusions, which are all statistically signiﬁcant
at the 5% level (the results of all the tests are shown in the Tables A11 to
A16 in Appendix A):
• Comparing small and large shocks (pairwise according to the direction
and the source of the shock), Table 7 reveals that more ﬁrms change
their prices in reaction to large shocks than to small shocks. Moreover,
the ﬁrms react more quickly to large than to small shocks.
• In the case of large demand shocks, we ﬁnd evidence that more ﬁrms
adjust their prices in response to a drop in demand than to an increase
in demand. We did not ask explicitly whether ﬁrms adjust their prices
upwards or downwards. However, we assume that ﬁrms reduce their
prices in response to shrinking demand and increase the prices in re-
sponse to boosted demand. The answers to question B13, where we
investigate how ﬁrms react to demand shocks (e.g. with price or with
output changes), justify this assumption as not one single ﬁrm indi-
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we conclude that prices are on average more ﬂexible downwards than
upwards in the face of large demand shocks.
• With regard to cost shocks, the opposite is true. In the case of cost
shocks (regardless of the size), more ﬁrms react to a cost-push shock
than to decreasing costs. Moreover, these ﬁrms react more quickly to
an upward cost shock than to a downward shock. Thus, the results
indicate that prices seem to be more ﬂexible upwards than downwards
in the face of cost shocks. We share this conclusion with Blinder et al.
(1998), who ﬁnd that price decreases come at a half-month longer lag
than price increases.
• Finally, we observe that signiﬁcantly more ﬁrms react to cost shocks
than to demand shocks (regardless of the size and the sign of the
shock).
To conclude, our results partly contradict the commonly held belief that
prices adjust more rapidly upward than downward. In fact, the degree and
direction of price rigidity seems to depend on the source of the shock. In the
face of signiﬁcant demand shocks, prices are more sticky upwards, while they
are more sticky downwards in the face of signiﬁcant cost shocks. Moreover,
prices are on average more rigid in response to shifts in demand than to cost
shocks.
5.3 Factors explaining price reactions after shocks
In this section probit regressions are estimated to gain some additional in-
sights on how ﬁrms react to shocks and thus on the sources of price stickiness
in Austria. In particular, we try to link the reaction of ﬁrms to demand and
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indicated in the survey that it reacts to shocks by adjusting prices or not
(as described in Section 5.2). We analyze the reaction of ﬁrms in our sample
to positive and negative demand as well as cost shocks. Moreover, we also
distinguish between small and large shocks. The diﬀerent types of shocks
will be dealt with separately in our analysis.
For all the estimations carried out in this section, the dependent variable
yi can take on two values. Let yi be equal to unity if a ﬁrm has indicated
that it changes its price in response to a given shock, and zero otherwise. For
this type of dependent variable, a probit model represents an appropriate
framework. In general, the model can be written as
P(yi = 1) = Φ(x0
iβ) (1)
where β is a vector of coeﬃcients, xi is a vector of explanatory variables and
Φ(·) denotes the cumulative normal distribution function.
Following Small and Yates (1999), we start by including proxies for the
overall degree of competitiveness, such as the market share of the ﬁrm and
the number of competitors, as explanatory variables. We also include a vari-
able that indicates the shape of the marginal cost curve since a ﬂat marginal
cost curve can be an explanation for constant prices in response to demand
shocks if we assume constant mark-ups. Since the relationship between ﬁrms
and customers might be important, we include the percentages of sales to
regular customers and to consumers. Customers may incur search and in-
formation costs to make optimal purchases, and these costs might in turn
inﬂuence the price-setting behavior of producers. Moreover, costumer rela-
tionships may be more important when dealing with consumers as opposed
to other ﬁrms (or the government).
Pricing to market has also been emphasized as a potential source of price
stickiness. If ﬁrms are active in foreign markets, they may price to market,
that is, set a price that reﬂects foreign market conditions.
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a dummy variable (market) that takes on the value unity if the market share
of the main product is above 30 percent, and zero otherwise.
The number of competitors (comp) is also a dummy that takes on the
value unity if a ﬁrm has at least ﬁve competitors, and zero otherwise. The
slope of the marginal cost curve is captured by the dummy mc that takes
on the value unity if the ﬁrm has indicated that it faces constant marginal
costs in question B5 of the questionnaire, and zero otherwise.
Furthermore, we include the fraction of sales achieved through regular
customers (regular) and the percentage of sales that is generated by selling
directly to consumers (con).
We also explore whether the probability of a price change is inﬂuenced by
explicit contracts and menu costs. For this purpose, we create the dummy
variable explicit that takes on the value unity if ﬁrms make arrangements
that guarantee a speciﬁc price for a certain period of time. Similarly, menu is
a dummy that indicates whether respondents rated menu costs as applicable
or higher (grades three or four) for preventing price increases and price
reductions. In addition, we include the variable export, which is the share
of turnover of the main product generated outside of Austria.
Finally, we include a set of dummies to capture industry and ﬁrm size
eﬀects. Firm size is continuous and measured by the number of employees,
emp. The dummy variable service takes on the value unity for ﬁrms in the
service sector, and zero otherwise.
Table 8 shows the results for large demand shocks. From the included
proxies for the overall degree of competitiveness, only the number of com-
petitors turns out to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. It appears that
ﬁrms having at least ﬁve competitors are more likely to adjust prices in re-
action to large demand shocks regardless of the sign of the shock. We also
ﬁnd that ﬁrms with a large fraction of regular customers are less likely to
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demand shocks as dependent variable
y = 1 if ﬁrms react to a y = 1 if ﬁrms react to a
large increase in demand large decrease in demand
Variable Coef. St. Err. p-val Coef. St. Err. p-val
market -0.3396 0.2151 0.12 -0.0027 0.2179 0.99
comp 0.4472 ** 0.2025 0.03 0.5658 *** 0.2076 0.01
mc 0.0028 0.1687 0.99 0.0921 0.1725 0.59
con -0.0017 0.0035 0.64 0.0017 0.0043 0.69
regular -0.0120 *** 0.0043 0.01 -0.0196 *** 0.0051 0.00
export 0.0066 *** 0.0027 0.01 0.0052 * 0.0028 0.06
explicit 0.2216 0.2024 0.27 0.0660 0.2085 0.75
menu -0.1871 0.3046 0.54 -0.1246 0.2876 0.67
service 0.0123 0.1670 0.94 -0.1867 0.1726 0.28
emp -0.0001 0.0004 0.73 0.0001 0.0004 0.77
constant 0.1675 0.4498 0.71 1.0596 ** 0.4974 0.03
Obs 476 434
F(10,466) 2.95 3.05
Prob > F 0.0013 0.0009
Notes to Table 8:
∗∗∗(∗∗)[∗] stands for signiﬁcant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level.
adjust their prices, whereas ﬁrms with a large export share are characterized
by a higher probability of reacting to large demand shocks.
In the case of small shocks to demand, the picture is somewhat diﬀerent
as can be seen in Table 9. The fraction of regular customers is still highly
signiﬁcant and negative for both decreases and increases in demand. How-
ever, for small negative demand shocks, sales to consumers and the shape of
the marginal cost curve are also signiﬁcantly and negatively related to the
probability of a price adjustment. Hence, we ﬁnd some evidence in favor of
asymmetries in the reaction to positive and negative demand shocks.
Next, Tables 10 and 11 show the results for cost shocks. For increases in
costs, none of our explanatory variables turns out to be diﬀerent from zero
at conventional signiﬁcance levels. For decreases in costs, however, we ﬁnd
that ﬁrms in the service sector are more likely to react by changing prices.
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demand shocks as dependent variable
y = 1 if ﬁrms react to a y = 1 if ﬁrms react to a
small increase in demand small decrease in demand
Variable Coef. St. Err. p-val Coef. St. Err. p-val
market 0.0787 0.2514 0.75 0.0331 0.2417 0.89
comp 0.4117 0.2541 0.11 0.1616 0.2174 0.46
mc -0.1534 0.1870 0.41 -0.4064 ** 0.1857 0.03
con -0.0061 0.0042 0.14 -0.0080 ** 0.0036 0.03
regular -0.0144 *** 0.0046 0.00 -0.0168 *** 0.0042 0.00
export 0.0029 0.0031 0.35 -0.0016 0.0028 0.55
explicit -0.1224 0.2181 0.58 0.1284 0.2151 0.55
menu -0.1832 0.2959 0.54 0.0317 0.3199 0.92
service -0.0373 0.1882 0.84 -0.0853 0.1807 0.64
emp -0.0001 0.0004 0.69 -0.0001 0.0004 0.86
constant 0.0120 0.4945 0.98 0.5999 0.4330 0.17
Obs 490 498
F(10,466) 1.75 2.50
Prob > F 0.0679 0.0061
Notes to Table 9:
∗∗∗(∗∗)[∗] stands for signiﬁcant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level.
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to consumers are more likely to adjust their prices.
As a robustness check we have repeated all our calculations with an al-
ternative deﬁnition of the dependent variable. In particular, we have deﬁned
yi = 1 if the ﬁrm has indicated that it changes its price within a period of
three months after the shock, and yi = 0 otherwise. Moreover, we have
estimated diﬀerent versions of our regressions, which include only one in-
dicator of the overall degree of competitiveness, that is, either market or
comp. However, our results are robust to these modiﬁcations.30
Table 10: Results from probit regressions with the price reaction to small
cost shocks as dependent variable
y = 1 if ﬁrms react to a y = 1 if ﬁrms react to a
slight increase in costs slight decrease in costs
Variable Coef. St. Err. p-val Coef. St. Err. p-val
market -0.0151 0.2050 0.94 -0.1395 0.2238 0.53
comp -0.0792 0.1979 0.69 0.0892 0.2278 0.70
mc -0.1921 0.1681 0.25 0.2597 0.1767 0.14
con -0.0034 0.0037 0.37 0.0022 0.0045 0.63
regular -0.0045 0.0041 0.27 0.0048 0.0048 0.32
export 0.0013 0.0025 0.62 0.0007 0.0028 0.80
explicit 0.2213 0.1968 0.26 0.0433 0.1903 0.82
menu -0.3542 0.2718 0.19 -0.0125 0.2651 0.96
service 0.1155 0.1670 0.49 1.3304 *** 0.1785 0.00
emp -0.0004 0.0003 0.29 -0.0005 0.0004 0.20
constant 0.7798 * 0.4265 0.07 -1.0175 ** 0.4878 0.04
Obs 487 502
F(10,466) 0.76 7.80
Prob > F 0.6721 0.0000
Notes to Table 10:
∗∗∗(∗∗)[∗] stands for signiﬁcant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level.
In short, we ﬁnd that in case of demand shocks, a high share of regular
customers decreases the probability of a price change. This is true regardless
of the size and the sign of the shocks, which makes it the most robust ﬁnding
30Detailed results are available upon request.
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cost shocks as dependent variable
y = 1 if ﬁrms react to a y = 1 if ﬁrms react to a
marked increase in costs marked decrease in costs
Variable Coef. St. Err. p-val Coef. St. Err. p-val
market -0.0525 0.2100 0.80 -0.3566 0.2228 0.11
comp 0.3405 0.2261 0.13 0.1586 0.2096 0.45
mc -0.2853 0.2913 0.33 -0.0518 0.1879 0.78
con 0.0055 0.0048 0.25 0.0114 ** 0.0037 0.00
regular 0.0044 0.0039 0.26 0.0098 0.0047 0.03
export -0.0020 0.0036 0.58 -0.0023 0.0027 0.40
explicit -0.3227 0.3113 0.30 0.1654 0.2339 0.48
menu -0.4677 0.3420 0.17 -0.3212 0.3173 0.31
service 0.3175 0.2935 0.28 0.7369 *** 0.1952 0.00
emp 0.0001 0.0004 0.84 0.0001 0.0003 0.65
constant 1.2206 ** 0.3934 0.00 -0.4474 0.4611 0.33
Obs 491 476
F(10,466) 3.07 4.74
Prob > F 0.0009 0.0000
Notes to Table 11:
∗∗∗(∗∗)[∗] stands for signiﬁcant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level.
of our analysis. Since implicit contracts are likely to play an important role
when ﬁrms deal with regular customers, this outcome is also consistent with
the ﬁndings reported in Section 4 indicating that implicit contracts are a
key explanation for price stickiness in our sample. In case of large demand
shocks, a higher number of competitors increases the probability of a price
adjustment. Furthermore, ﬁrms with a higher share of exports are more
likely to change their price in response to big demand shocks. In the case
of cost-push shocks, there is no statistical evidence for any diﬀerence in the
pricing behavior across the ﬁrms in our sample. This suggests that a rise in
costs triggers a similar response by all ﬁrms in the economy. Note that this
is in line with the result that 92 percent of all ﬁrms adjust their prices in
response to a large cost-push shock as reported in Table 7. For a decrease
in costs, we ﬁnd that the service sector is more likely to react with a price
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adjustment.Note, however, that our results should be interpreted with some caution
since the ﬁt of our equations and the statistical levels of signiﬁcance are not
always satisfactory. This is particularly true for cost shocks.
6 Summary
We ﬁnd evidence that the ﬁrms in our sample follow time-dependent as well
as state-dependent pricing strategies. Under normal circumstances around
70 percent of the ﬁrms apply time-dependent pricing. However, in the face
of major shocks almost half of the ﬁrms deviate from this strategy and set
their prices according to the state of the economy. Comparing this share with
evidence from other countries suggests that the share of ﬁrms following state-
dependent pricing rules in response to large shocks (56 percent) is relatively
small in Austria, which suggests that real eﬀects of monetary policy should
(ceteris paribus) be stronger.
Furthermore, our results suggest that price setting takes place at two
stages. First, ﬁrms review their prices to check whether they are at the
optimal level or they need to be changed. Second, if ﬁrms ﬁnd out that
the price deviates from its optimal level, they need to decide whether to
change the price or not. We ﬁnd evidence that there are obstacles to price
adjustments at both stages. However, the contest of the theories about price
stickiness reveals that the main obstacles to price adjustment seem to lie at
the second stage of price setting. In contrast to the suggestion of Ball and
Mankiw (1994), informational costs, which are important at the reviewing
stage of price setting, do not seem to be among the most important obstacles
to price changes. The fear that a price adjustment could jeopardize customer
relationships (expressed in the theories on implicit and explicit contracts)
seems to be a much more important explanation for sticky prices. The
implicit contract theory, which was heavily recognized by our respondents,
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as fairer than price adjustments in response to demand shocks. This ﬁnding
ties in with Rotemberg (2002), who also argues that fairness is an important
driving force in customers’ decisions.
Finally, we investigate the reaction of prices to (cost and demand) shocks.
The average time lag between a shock and the price adjustment is four to six
months. Furthermore, we observe that ﬁrms react asymmetrically to cost
and demand shocks. Prices are more sticky downwards than upwards in the
face of cost shocks as more ﬁrms react more quickly to cost-push shocks
than to decreasing cost shocks. In the case of large demand shocks, how-
ever, the opposite is true. Prices are more sticky upwards than downwards,
because more ﬁrms react to receding demand than to increasing demand.
If we interpret a monetary shock as a demand shock, it follows that mone-
tary policy has an asymmetric impact on the Austrian economy. The price
reaction after a signiﬁcant contractive monetary policy shock should thus
be more pronounced than after a signiﬁcant expansionary monetary policy
shock. Note, however, that although the number of ﬁrms reacting to a de-
mand shock with a price adjustment diﬀers signiﬁcantly with respect to the
direction of the shock, this does not necessarily mean that this translates
into a meaningful diﬀerence in economic terms as well. It could be that
the diﬀerences we observe in our sample are too small in order to matter
economically.
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1% - 19% 33.96 4.91
20% - 39% 38.23 5.53
40% - 59% 55.19 7.99
60% - 79% 66.73 9.66
80% - 99% 232.94 33.71
100 % 254.02 36.76
691.00 100.00
Table A3: Question A4. What percentage of sales do you generate by selling




within group 32.80 4.71
other companies 381.09 54.75
government 35.05 5.04
consumers 51.89 7.46
no main customer 77.30 11.11
others 20.91 3.00
696.00 100.00
Notes to Table A3: The main customer is deﬁned as generating more than 50% of the
sales of the company.
Table A4: Question A6. How many competitors do you have for your main
product on its most important market?
Frequency Percent
none 10.46 1.47
fewer than 5 114.14 16.03
between 5 and 20 286.39 40.22
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March 2005Table A5: Question A8. What percentage of sales do you achieve through
regular customers?
Frequency Percent
0% - 20% 14.98 2.13
21% - 40% 24.99 3.56
41% - 60% 52.38 7.45
61% - 80% 254.57 36.21
81% - 100% 356.08 50.65
703.00 100.00
Table A6: Macroeconomic indicators for Austria 1999 to 2003
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Annual changes in percent
Gross domestic product 3.3 3.4 0.7 1.2 0.8
Consumer price index 0.6 2.3 2.7 1.8 1.3
Real wages per capita 1.0 1.0 -0.8 1.0 0.5
Unemployment rate (in %) 4.0 3.7 3.6 4.2 4.3
Fiscal balance (in % of GDP) -2.2 -1.5 0.3 -0.2 -1.1
Notes to Table A6: Source: WIFO Database.
Table A7: Frequency of price changes in diﬀerent sectors (in %)
Number of price changes per year 0 1 2-3 4-11 12-49 50-
Total 22.1 54.2 13.9 7.7 1.2 0.9
Consumer non-durables 5.9 71.7 17.4 1.8 0.0 3.2
Consumer durables 0.6 75.5 23.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
Intermediate goods 4.1 55.1 24.9 14.1 0.4 1.4
Capital goods 6.4 53.8 25.3 8.7 2.9 2.9
Services 35.3 48.3 7.3 7.6 1.5 0.0
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March 2005Table A11: Comparison between small and large shocks with respect to the
fraction of ﬁrms holding the price constant
Fraction of
ﬁrms holding
Type of shock the price constant t-statistics
Small positive demand shock 82% 7.52 ***
Large positive demand shock 63%
Small negative demand shock 82% 11.05 ***
Large negative demand shock 52%
Small cost-push shock 38% 10.09 ***
Large cost-push shock 8%
Small decreasing cost shock 71% 8.77 ***
Large decreasing cost shock 38%
Notes to Table A11: Ho = No diﬀerence between the fractions with respect to large and
small shocks.
∗∗∗(∗∗)[∗] stands for signiﬁcant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level.
Table A12: Comparison between small and large shocks with respect to the
mean lag
Type of shock Mean lag t-statistics
Small positive demand shock 6.1 5.22 ***
Large positive demand shock 4.6
Small negative demand shock 4.6 4.50 ***
Large negative demand shock 3.6
Small cost-push shock 4.8 5.86 ***
Large cost-push shock 3.8
Small decreasing cost shock 4.8 4.15 ***
Large decreasing cost shock 4.2
Notes to Table A12: Ho = No diﬀerence between the means with respect to large and
small shocks.
∗∗∗(∗∗)[∗] stands for signiﬁcant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level.
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to the fraction of ﬁrms holding the price constant
Fraction of
ﬁrms holding
Type of shock the price constant t-statistics
Small positive demand shock 82%
Small negative demand shock 82% 0.00
Large positive demand shock 63%
Large negative demand shock 52% 3.79 ***
Small cost-push shock 38%
Small decreasing cost shock 71% -9.98 ***
Large cost-push shock 8%
Large decreasing cost shock 38% -9.39 ***
Notes to Table A13: Ho = No diﬀerence between the fractions with respect to positive
and negative shocks.
∗∗∗(∗∗)[∗] stands for signiﬁcant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level.
Table A14: Comparison between positive and negative shocks with respect
to the mean lag
Type of shock Mean lag t-statistics
Small positive demand shock 6.1
Small negative demand shock 4.6 -1.48
Large positive demand shock 4.6
Large negative demand shock 3.6 0.61
Small cost-push shock 4.8
Small decreasing cost shock 4.8 -2.40 **(1)
Large cost-push shock 3.8
Large decreasing cost shock 4.2 -5.05 ***
Notes to Table A14: Ho = No diﬀerence between the means with respect to positive and
negative shocks.
∗∗∗(∗∗)[∗] stands for signiﬁcant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. (1) The mean
lags reported in this table are averages over the whole sample. The t-tests, however, only
take those ﬁrms into account that have answered both questions. Thus, the means used
for the t-test can deviate from the means reported in the table.
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the fraction of ﬁrms holding the price constant
Fraction of
ﬁrms holding
Type of shock the price constant t-statistics
Small positive demand shock 82% 15.93 ***
Small cost-push shock 38%
Small negative demand shock 82% 4.03 ***
Small decreasing cost shock 71%
Large positive demand shock 63% 16.58 ***
Large cost-push shock 8%
Large negative demand shock 52% 4.06 ***
Large decreasing cost shock 38%
Notes to Table A15: Ho = No diﬀerence between the fractions with respect to cost and
demand shocks.
∗∗∗(∗∗)[∗] stands for signiﬁcant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level.
Table A16: Comparison between cost and demand shocks with respect to
the mean lag
Type of shock Mean lag t-statistics
Small positive demand shock 6.1 1.25
Small cost-push shock 4.8
Small negative demand shock 4.6 -0.67
Small decreasing cost shock 4.8
Large positive demand shock 4.6 4.39 ***
Large cost-push shock 3.8
Large negative demand shock 3.6 -2.08 **
Large decreasing cost shock 4.2
Notes to Table A16: Ho = No diﬀerence between the means with respect to cost and
demand shocks.
∗∗∗(∗∗)[∗] stands for signiﬁcant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level.
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A1. What is your main product?......................................|_______________________________________________________| 
 
 
A2. What percentage of sales does your main product account for? ...……………..………....…………..……..…....    |__|__|__|% 
 
 
A3. What share of the turnover of your main product is 




·  in Austria............................................................ 
·  in the euro area (except Austria)…………..…… 
·  in other EU countries /  
in EU acceding countries
1…………………...…... 













127(When answering the following questions, please reflect on the market which is most important for 
 your main product. Thus, refer all your answers to the market with the highest percentage share 
 in question A3. 
 
 




·  to wholesalers?................................................... 
·  to retailers?.......................................................... 
·  within the corporate group?................................. 
·  to other companies?............................................ 
·  to the government?.................…..………………. 
·  to consumers (directly or via catalogues or 
the Internet)?....................................................... 
·  via other channels…………..…………………….. 

















A5. What is the market share of your main product on   




·  1% - 5% ..........…………………....………………. 
·  6% - 10%  …………..........................………….... 
·  11% - 20% .......................……………………..… 
·  21% - 30% .....................................……………... 
·  31% - 50% .......................................................... 










                                                           




·  This questionnaire is intended to inform us about your pricing policy. When answering the following questions, 
please reflect on the product that best represents your company. (You can, for example, choose the best-
selling product of the year 2003.) This product will be referred to as "main product". 
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A6. How many (national and international) competitors do you 









·  none………………………………………………… 
·  fewer than 5 …………..…………………………… 
·  between 5 and 20…………...…………………….. 











A7.  How many customers do you have with regard to your 
main product on its most important market? 
 
 
    Number of customers........|_|_|_|_|_|_| 
 
A8.  What percentage of sales do you achieve through regular 
customers (customers you have been doing business with 





·  Regular customers…………………..…………..   














B1.  Do you determine the price of your main product    





·  We determine the price  …………....................... 
·  The parent company determines the price…..…. 
·  Our main customers determine the price…….… 
·  Public agencies determine the price……………. 
·  Others……….……………………………………… 








B2a.  Do you make arrangements with your customers 
in which you guarantee to offer your main product 




         No…..      Yes. Transactions under such  
      arrangements account for 
0% -   25%....... 
26% -   50%....... 
51% -   75%....... 
76% - 100%....... 











B2b.  If you have such arrangements in place, for how long do 














      No.......                Yes. Please specify below. 
·  Large quantity discounts…................................... 
·  Discounts for regular customers........................... 
·  Cash discounts…….………………………………. 
·  Discounts depending on the market situation…... 
·  Seasonal discounts (e.g. sales)………………...... 












127( The word "price“ refers to the actual selling price of your main product. Please refer your answers to the price you 
actually charge including discounts. 
Production costs can be divided into fixed costs and variable costs. Fixed costs remain constant, no matter how 
much you produce (e.g. rental fee, acquisition costs of machines). Variable costs change with the production level 
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We add a constant mark-up to the variable production costs 
per unit (mark-up pricing). 
 
           
 
Basically, we apply mark-up pricing. However, when we step 
up production, the variable costs increase to such a large 
extent that we cannot raise the price accordingly. As a 
consequence, we have to reduce the mark-up.  
 
           
 
Basically, we apply mark-up pricing. However, when we step 
up production, the variable costs decrease so that we can 
increase the mark-up.  
 
           
 
We set the price at the market level.   
 
           
 
We set the price (slightly) above the market level. 
 
           
 
We set the price (slightly) below the market level. 
 
           
 
We choose the price of our main product in a different way.    




B4b.  Do you base your pricing decisions on data from 




·  On data from previous years…………….…... 
·  On forecasts................................................... 








B5. Suppose you produce at the normal production level and 
you would like to slightly increase production (within the 
given capacity limits). How would the variable production 





·  They increase strongly.................................. 
·  They increase slightly................................... 
·  They remain constant................................... 
·  They decrease slightly.................................. 
·  They decrease strongly................................. 










B6a.  We assume that companies check their prices from time to time, but that they  
do not necessarily change them.  
  Do you check the price of your main product… 
 
·  regularly?............................................................................................. 
·  on specific occasions (e.g. when costs change considerably)?.......... 
·  in general regularly and also on specific occasions  
  (e.g. significant changes in costs or demand)?................................... 
·  for other reasons?............................................................................... 
  e.g.  _______________________________________________ 




   &RQWLQXHZLWKTXHVWLRQ%E
   &RQWLQXHZLWKTXHVWLRQ% 
 
   &RQWLQXHZLWKTXHVWLRQ%E 
   &RQWLQXHZLWKTXHVWLRQ%
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B6b.  You check the price of your main product regularly. 




·  daily………..……………..................……….. 
·  weekly……..……………..…...........…….….. 
·  monthly………..……………………....……… 
·  quarterly….……………….…....................…. 
·  twice a year…………………………………… 
·  yearly………….…………………….…........... 














How often do you change the price of your main product on average in a given year?    |______| times 
 
B8a.  If there are reasons to raise the price of your main product, which of the following factors might prevent an immediate 
price increase? 
 












   
don't 
know 
The concern that our competitors will not raise prices and 
that we will be the first to raise prices. We will wait until the 
competitors raise prices and will follow.  
           
We have arrangements with our customers, in which we 
guarantee to offer our main product at a specific price. 
           
The price we used up to now was a psychological price (e.g. 
9.90); we would change this price only if the new price were 
also a psychological price.  
           
The concern that subsequently we will have to readjust the 
price in the opposite direction.  
           
Raising prices entails costs; we have to print new price lists 
(or catalogues), for example, or we have to modify our 
website. 
           
We will raise prices only if costs rise, but as a rule, we wait a 
bit before raising prices.  
           
We will do without price increases and will change other 
product parameters – e.g. extend delivery times. 
           
 
   
 
B8b.  If there are reasons to reduce the price of your main product, which of the following factors might prevent an immediate 
price reduction? 
 












   
don't 
know 
Concerns that our price reduction might trigger a price war 
with our competitors.  
           
We have arrangements with our customers, in which we 
guarantee to offer our main product at a specific price. 
           
Concerns that our customers could interpret the price 
reduction as a reduction in quality.  
           
The price we used up to now was a psychological price (e.g. 
9.90); we would change this price only if the new price were 
also a psychological price.  
           
The concern that subsequently we will have to readjust the 
price in the opposite direction.  
           
Reducing prices entails costs; we have to print new price 
lists (or catalogues), for example, or we have to modify our 
website.  
           
We will reduce prices only if costs decrease, but as a rule, 
we wait a bit before reducing prices.  
           
We will do without price reductions and will change other 
product parameters – e.g. shorten delivery times. 
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B9a.  It could also be that you wish to keep the price of your 
main  product  constant  because  you  stand  to  lose 
many customers if you raise prices, but do not stand 
to  gain  many  new  customers  by  reducing  prices.  
Please  indicate  the  degree  to  which  this  statement 



























   
   
 
B9b.  Some  customers  consider  price  increases  resulting 
from higher demand less fair than those resulting from 
higher  costs.  Do  you  keep  prices  constant  despite 
demand  fluctuations  because  you  do  not  want  to 
jeopardise your customer relationships.    
Please  indicate  the  degree  to  which  this  statement 



























   
   
 
B9c.  Another reason for not adjusting prices (at least not 
immediately) is that gathering information relevant for 
pricing decisions is costly in terms of time and/or 
money. 
Please indicate the degree to which this statement 



























   
   
 
B10a. If demand for your main product rises slightly, how much time 
passes before you change prices?  
 
Number of months............... 






B10b. If demand for your main product rises markedly, how much 
time passes before you change prices?  
 
Number of months............... 






B10c. If demand for your main product drops slightly, how much 
time passes before you change prices?  
 
Number of months............... 






B10d. If demand for your main product drops markedly, how much 
time passes before you change prices?  
 
Number of months............... 






B10e. If the cost for producing your main product rises slightly, how 
much time passes before you change prices? 
 
Number of months............... 






B10f.   If the cost for producing your main product rises markedly, 
how much time passes before you change prices? 
 
Number of months............... 






B10g. If the cost for producing your main product drops slightly, 
how much time passes before you change prices?  
 
Number of months............... 






B10h. If the cost for producing your main product drops markedly, 
how much time passes before you change prices?  
 
Number of months............... 
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B11a.  Please reflect on the price increases of your main product in recent years.  
 
In recent years we have not raised the price of our main product.   
Which of the factors below were relevant for the price increases? 
     &RQWLQXHZLWKTXHVWLRQ%E

 












   
don’t 
know 
Wage costs rose.              
Capital costs (loan interest) rose.              
Purchased goods and services or raw materials became 
more expensive.  
           
Taxes were raised.              
We improved the quality of our main product.              
The competitors raised their prices.              
We raise prices at regular intervals.              
Demand for our main product rose.              
A public agency (e.g. price regulator) authorised a 
higher price.  
           
We link our price to the general price level (indexation).              
Forecasts on inflation and/or business activity for the 
upcoming years changed.  
           
 
 
           
 
 
B11b.  Please reflect on the price reductions of your main product in recent years.  
 
    In recent years we have not reduced the price of our main product.   
Which of the factors below were relevant for the price reductions? 
     &RQWLQXHZLWKTXHVWLRQ%D

 












   
don’t 
know 
Wage costs fell.              
Capital costs (loan interest) fell.              
Purchased goods and services or raw materials became 
less expensive.  
           
Taxes were cut.              
We managed to produce the main product at less costs 
owing to our improved production process.  
           
The competitors lowered their prices.              
The competitors introduced new and better products to 
the market.  
           
We reduce prices at regular intervals.              
Demand for our main product fell.              
A public agency (e.g. price regulator) called for a lower 
price.  
           
We link our price to the general price level (indexation).             
Forecasts on inflation and/or business activity for the 
upcoming years changed.  
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B12a.  Did the introduction of euro banknotes and coins (at the 
beginning of 2002) have any effect on prices of 
purchased goods and services (e.g. intermediate inputs) 







Yes.   








B12b.  Did the introduction of euro banknotes and coins (at the 
beginning of 2002) have any effect on prices of the 
















B13a.  If the demand for your main product decreased 




·  We reduce prices................................................ 
·  We cut overtime and/or lay off people................. 
·  We reduce investment and/or close down 
facilities................................................................ 
·  We build up inventory rather than reducing 
output ................................................................. 
·  We increase the funds for marketing……........... 
·  We offer new products……………………………. 
·  Other measures................................................... 
such as _______________________________ 















B13b.  If that the demand for your main product decreased 




·  We reduce prices................................................ 
·  We cut overtime and/or lay off people................. 
·  We reduce investment and/or close down 
facilities................................................................ 
·  We build up inventory rather than reducing 
output ................................................................. 
·  We increase the funds for marketing……........... 
·  We offer new products……………………………. 
·  Other measures................................................... 
such as _______________________________ 















B13c.  If the demand for your main product increased 






·  We raise prices.................................................... 
·  We do more overtime and/or hire more 
people………………………………...................... 
·  We increase investment and/or buy new 
facilities............................................................... 
·  We reduce inventory rather than  
raising output………………………………………. 
·  Other measures………………............................. 
such as _______________________________ 




    








B13d.  If the demand for your main product increased 






·  We raise prices.................................................... 
·  We do more overtime and/or hire more 
people………………………………...................... 
·  We increase investment and/or buy new 
facilities............................................................... 
·  We reduce inventory rather than  
raising output………………………………………. 
·  Other measures………………............................. 
such as _______________________________ 




    
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